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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN WAYNE PORTERf t 
P e t i t i o n e r f : Case No. 860647 
v# : P r i o r i t y No* 3 
GERALD COOK# : 
R e s p o n d e n t . : 
JURISPICTIQH 
T h i s a p p e a l i s from a d e n i a l of a w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s 
a f t e r a t r i a l in t h e T h i r d D i s t r i c t Cour t* Th i s C o u r t has 
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hea r t h e a p p e a l under Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 - 2 
(1987) and 5 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( f ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. I s Pe t i t ione r en t i t l ed to review of the merits of 
h is pe t i t ion? 
2. Was pe t i t i one r denied effect ive assis tance of 
counsel? 
3 . Did the prosecutor withhold exculpatory evidence 
and use perjured testimony a t t r i a l ? 
4. Was Pe t i t ione r denied the use of compulsory process 
to obtain the attendance of witnesses? 
5 . Was P e t i t i o n e r d e n i e d t h e r i g h t t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e 
r e g a r d i n g t h e u s e of t h e s c a n n e r ? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
P e t i t i o n e r was c h a r g e d w i t h a g g r a v a t e d b u r g l a r y , a 
f i r s t d e g r e e f e l o n y , in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. $ 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 3 
( 1 9 7 8 ) ; b u r g l a r y , a t h i r d d e g r e e f e l o n y , i n v i o l a t i o n of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978); and thett, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann, S 76-6-404 (1978). He was tried 
before a jury in Third District Courtf the Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwinf presiding. The jury found petitioner guilty on all 
counts, and Judge Baldwin sentenced petitioner to a prison term 
of five years to life. The Supreme Court artirmed the 
convictions in Sla.t£_Sjt_PflJLi£I, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) 
(Appendix A) • 
Following his appeal, petitioner filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief in Third District Court. The Honorable 
Judith M. Billings held an evidentiary hearing and after taking 
the matter under advisement denied petitioner relief on October 
21, 1986. Petitioner appeals from that denial. 
fiTAT£MJ?NT.fir^ZACJS 
On February 22, 1984, shortly after midnight, police 
officers found petitioner lying on the floor inside a vacant unit 
of a Salt Lake City apartment house. Petitioner gave no 
explanation for his presence there (CT 180), and had not been 
given permission to use the apartment (CT 124). Indeed, the 
apartment manager alerted police to petitioner's presence in the 
apartment, after observing him enter the apartment using lock 
picks (CT 111). While examining a coat found at the scene, one 
of the officers found a loaded pistol (CT 179). Other items 
discovered in the coat, in petitioner's knapsack, or on his 
1
 Throughout this document "CT" will refer to the criminal trial 
transcript and "HT" will refer to the habeas corpus transcript. 
The CT is contained in exhibit 3D ot the habeas hearing exhibits. 
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person were lock picks (CT 182) , v i s e grip p l i e r s (CT 183)
 9 a 
pair of needlenose p l i e r s (CT 232)
 f a "police scanner11 (CT 188) 9 
a black notebook containing the radio frequencies of many local 
law enforcement agencies (CT 182) , and a large quantity of dimes 
(CT 193) . (£££ general ly CT 102 "Exhibits") . 
When asked by the o f f i c e r s about h i s presence in the 
apartment* p e t i t i o n e r repl ied "You have got me. What e l s e can I 
say?" (CT 180) . Pe t i t i oner was arrested and charged with 
aggravated burglary of an apartment. 
The next morning the apartment manager discovered that 
the laundry room had been burglarized, and a large quantity of 
dimes taken from a dryer (CT 124) . The amount of dimes missing 
roughly matched the amount found in p e t i t i o n e r ' s coat (compare CT 
194 with CT 137) . In addi t ion , the marks on the dryer were 
c o n s i s t e n t with marks made by v i s e grip p l i e r s (CT 126-7) . 
P e t i t i o n e r was further charged with burglary of the laundry room. 
Pe t i t i oner was appointed counsel for h is preliminary 
bearing and h i s case was bound over the d i s t r i c t court . He f ired 
h i s appointed attorney and was appointed another attorney (HT 
126-7) . 
Following h i s conv ic t ion , p e t i t i o n e r retained a third 
attorney to handle h i s appeal. On appeal, t h i s Court rejected 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s content ions that the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t to 
support h i s c o n v i c t i o n . The Court s imi lar ly rejected claims that 
p e t i t i o n e r was unfavorably prejudiced by an addit ional jury 
i n s t r u c t i o n , that a jury ins truct ion given was erronous, and that 
p e t i t i o n e r was denied the r ight to represent himself , gee State 
v. Porter , 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) . 
Following his unsuccessful appeal, petitioner filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief in Third District Court, 
through yet another attorney. Judge Billings denied the State's 
motion to dismiss and held an evidentiary hearing on the petition 
allowing petitioner to air his claims. Following the hearing the 
court ruled against petitioner, finding that: (1) trial counsel 
had been legally effective and that any errors alleged amount to 
"minor oversights or trial strategy decisions well within the 
bounds of competant representation" (HT 74); (2) that no evidence 
indicated that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence (HT 
74); (3) that no evidence pointed to the prejudicial importance 
of a prosecutorial witness not called at trial (HT 75); and (4) 
that the Court need not reach the issue ot appellate counsel's 
effectiveness because trial counsel had been effective (HT 75) 
(Appendix B). Petitioner now appeals from that ruling. 
Petitioner may not use the remedy of habeas corpus as a 
substitute for direct appeal. Although Judge Billings made a 
decision to review the merits of the petition, it would be in 
contravention ot the purpose of habeas corpus as an extraordinary 
remedy for this Court to address the merits of petitioner's 
claim. 
Should this Court address the merits of petitioner's 
appeal, the findings of the lower court are entitled to a 
presumption of correctness. This presumption may be overcome 
only by a showing tnat the lower court had no reasonable basis 
for its judgment. In the instant case, the record clearly 
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ind ica tes that Judge B i l l i n g s had ample bas is for her denial of 
the w r i t . 
Pe t i t ioner was not denied e f f e c t i v e ass i s tance of 
counsel at t r i a l or on appeal* Trial counsel invest igated the 
c a s e , met with p e t i t i o n e r on numerous occasions and e f f e c t i v e l y 
represented pe t i t i oner at t r i a l . Appellate counsel also talked 
with p e t i t i o n e r on numerous occasions concerning h i s ca se . His 
dec i s ion not to argue i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of t r i a l counsel was 
based upon the record and h i s experience as an attorney. 
Pe t i t ioner has not shown that prosecutorial error 
occurred at the t r i a l . There i s no evidence in the record that 
the State withheld exculpatory evidence or used perjured 
testimony. The "perjured testimony" that p e t i t i o n e r points to 
are merely d iscrepancies in testimony which a r i s e in any court 
proceeding and go to the weight of evidence before the jury. 
Pe t i t i oner was not denied compulsory process to obtain 
the presence of wi tnesses at t r i a l . He has fa i l ed to provide the 
name of any witness who would have provided exculpatory evidence 
on h i s behalf . 
The t r i a l court permitted p e t i t i o n e r to present 
evidence regarding the scanner. Thus, p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim that 
the court denied him the r ight to present evidence regarding the 
scanner i s without meri t . 
AHSVKENT 
EQUQLI 
PETITIONER MAY NOT USE THE REMEDY OF HABEAS 
CORPUS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DIRECT APPEAL 
I t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t the p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n w r i t of 
habeas corpus provided for in Rule 6 5 B ( i ) , Utah R. C i v . P . , " i s 
no t a s u b s t i t u t e for and cannot be used t o perform the f u n c t i o n 
of r e g u l a r a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w . " Coflianna Vt MortlSr 660 P.2d 1101 
(Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . £££. . a l i a Andrews v . M o r r i s . 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1980) £ £ i t . 3eni<?3f 449 U . S . 891 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; Rmpe l y t Smith , 560 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) . Consequent ly f Petitioner cannot raise 
issues in a habeas proceeding that could have been raised on 
direct appeal, except in unusual circumstances. Robbins v. Cook, 
737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101 
(1983). £££ AL&2 Brown v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 
(1968) . 
The types of unusual errors which are properly 
cognizable by habeas corpus are narrowly limited to the following 
situations: (1) when the trial court had no jurisdiction over 
the person or the offense; (2) when the requirements of the law 
have been so disregarded that the party is substantially and 
effectively denied due process of law; or (3) where some such 
fact is shown that i t would be wholly unconscionable not to 
reexamine the conviction. Brown v. Turner. 21 Utah 2d at 98, 440 
P.2d at 969. The Court further stated in £x£HH: 
If the contention of error is something which 
is known to the party at the time the 
judgment was entered, i t must be reviewed in 
the manner and within the time permitted by 
regular prescribed procedure, or the judgment 
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becomes f inal and i s not subject to further 
at tack , except in some unusual circumstance. 
• . . Were i t otherwise , the regular rules of 
procedure governing appeals and the 
l i m i t a t i o n s of time spec i f ied therein would 
be rendered impotent. 
iXfiMHf 21 Utah 2d at 98, 440 P.2d at 969. 
Pe t i t i oner had an opportunity to ra i s e on d i r e c t appeal 
the i s sues he now r a i s e s but fa i l ed to do s o . By rais ing these 
i s sues now, pe t i t i oner attempts to circumvent the normal 
appel la te process . 
In the ins tant case , p e t i t i o n e r has had a d irec t appeal 
of h i s convict ion and habeas corpus review of h i s convict ion and 
appeal. P e t i t i o n e r ' s present appeal from denial of his writ of 
habeas corpus amounts to a third appeal of h i s i n i t i a l 
conv ic t ion . However, p e t i t i o n e r ' s arguments are of the type that 
should have been made on d i r e c t appeal. Judge B i l l i n g ' s dec i s ion 
to err on the side of caut ion and review the merits of the 
p e t i t i o n does not require that t h i s Court further review the 
mer i t s . 
In the event t h i s Court f inds procedural de faul t y e t 
somehow reaches the merits in the a l t e r n a t i v e , respondent urges 
that such treatment of the merits be c l e a r l y ident i f i ed as dictum 
and not as an a l ternate holding of the case . 
Federal law i s c l ear that s t a t e prisoners who are 
barred by procedural de faul t committed at the t r i a l l e v e l from 
ra i s ing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims on d i rec t appeal are a l so barred 
from l i t i g a t i n g such claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings 
unless they can show adequate "cause" for and "actual prejudice1* 
from the d e f a u l t . Enole v. I saac , 456 U.S. 107 (1982); 
Wainwrioht v. Sykes. 433 U.S. 72 (1977) , reh'q. denied. 434 U.S. 
880 (1977); Murray v. Carrier. U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 2639 
(1986) . 
Conversely, i t i s a l so wel l -es tabl ished t ha t where a 
s t a t e court chooses not to invoke i t s own procedural defaul t 
ru l e s and instead reaches the meri ts of a defendant 's claims, the 
federal courts may l ikewise reach the meri ts on habeas corpus. 
Cgupty court <?t Ulster County yt Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979); 
Enqle V. I S ^ C 456 U.S. 107, 135, n. 44 (1982); Hux v. Murphv, 
733 F.2d 737, 738-39 (10th C i r . 1984), c e r t , denied. 471 U.S. 
1103 (1985), overruled on d i f fe ren t grounds in Wiley v. Rayl, 767 
F.2d 679, 681 n.2 (10th C i r . 1985). 
In Morishita v. Morris . 621 P.2d 691 (Utah 1980); t h i s 
Court denied review of appe l l an t ' s claim based upon procedural 
de fau l t , yet addressed the meri ts of the claim in the 
a l t e r n a t i v e , and in a footnote, but without c l ea r ly identifying 
the added analys is as d ic t im. Later , the federal d i s t r i c t court 
for Utah found tha t because th i s Court invoked i t s procedural 
defaul t ru le and apparently addressed the meri ts only in dic t im, 
federal habeas corpus review of the i r meri ts was barred. The 
Tenth Ci rcu i t Court of Appeals reversed finding that because the 
meri ts had been reached by t h i s Court, the federal cour t s could 
l ikewise reach the mer i t s .2 Morishita v. Morris . 702 F.2d 207, 
209 (10th C i r . 1983) . 
2 The Tenth Ci rcu i t then reached the meri ts and ul t imate ly denied 
the p e t i t i o n e r ' s request for habeas corpus r e l i e f . 
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Frankly f the Tenth Circui t Court's analys i s does not 
comport with the weight of authority on such c a s e s . In most 
•dual grounds" cases federal courts have held that the Sykes. 
procedural default bar to federal habeas review of the claims on 
the merits s t i l l a p p l i e s . £££ P h i l l i p s v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 
47-51 (2d Cir . 1983) , £££jt. denied. 465 U.S. 1027 (1984) ( c i t ing 
Michigan v. Long. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)) ; United g t e t e s ex r e l t 
CartfSP Vt ZelinsKy, 689 F.2d 435, 439-40 (3d Cir . 1982) ( s ta t e 
court re l iance on procedural bar as an a l t erna t ive holding 
s u f f i c e s to bar federal habeas review; those i n t e r e s t s that 
j u s t i f y adoption and enforcement of procedural rules are equally 
presented by a d i scuss ion on the meri t s ; a s t a t e court may reach 
the merits of a claim merely to give guidance on a d i f f i c u l t and 
unset t led i ssue of law or to show i t s dec i s ion grounded on 
procedure i s not unfa ir ) ; Ratc l i f f v. E s t e l l e . 597 F.2d 474, 478 
(5th Cir . 1979) , c e r t , denied. 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Hockenburv v. 
Sowders. 620 F.2d 111 (6th Cir . 1980) , reh'g denied. 633 F.2d 443 
(6th Cir . 1980) , c e r t , denied. 450 U.S. 933 (1981) (where 
procedural de faul t was a "substantial bas i s" of the s t a t e cour t ' s 
denial of r e l i e f , federal court barred from reaching mer i t s ) ; 
United States ex relt Veal Vt PeRoberts, 693 F.2d 642, 650 (7th 
Cir . 1982); Dietz v . Solem. 640 F.2d 126, 131-32, n. 1 (8th Cir . 
1981) ( s t a t e courts may choose to reach merits in dictum, ye t 
invoke procedural defaul t which has federal habeas review on 
merits); Pobfrert v. StricKlanfl, 718 F.2d 1518, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 
1983), ££££• flgnifiir 468 U.S. 1220 (1984). 
When a s t a t e court opinion i s s i l e n t or otherwise 
ambiguous as to whether a claim was denied on procedural grounds, 
on the mer i t s , or both, the Sykes bar has been applied by some 
courts so long as procedural de fau l t was argued by the 
government. £££. Martinez v. Harris . 675 F.2d 51 (2d Cir . 1982) , 
££JLt. denied. 459 U.S. 1024 (1982) . See also Webb v. Webb. 451 
U.S. 493, 495 (1981) ; S tree t v . New York. 394 U.S. 576, 582 
(1969); Raper v. Mintzes . 706 F.2d 161 (6th Cir . 1983) (dictum); 
Preston y t Maggjp, 705 F.2d 113, 115-16 (5th Cir . 1983); Taylor 
v. Harris . 640 F.2d 1 (2d Cir . 1981) , £e_x_t. denied. 452 U.S. 942 
(1981); Lewis v . Cardwell. 609 F.2d 926 (9th Cir . 1979) . 
However, some dec i s ions apply a presumption that a dec i s ion or 
order was on the merits unless i t ind ica te s the contrary, e . g . . 
Be l l y t Wfltkjns, 692 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir . 1982) , cert* 
denied, sub nom: B e l l v . Thiapen. 464 U.S. 843 (1983) . Some 
d e c i s i o n s seem to apply a contrary presumption, e . g . . Hall v . 
S tate of Alabama. 700 F.2d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir . 1983); Bailey v . 
£liy_£jL, 695 F.2d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir . 1983) ("lw]e cannot say 
the merits of p e t i t i o n e r ' s claims were reached on the bas i s of 
such an order") ; and in s t i l l other d e c i s i o n s the federal courts 
attempt to infer the actual bas i s of the s t a t e c o u r t ' s ruling 
from fac tors such as the h i s tory of the c a s e , the s t a t e court 
pleadings and b r i e f s , and other cons idera t ions , e . g . McKinon v . 
Wainwrioht. 705 F.2d 419, 421 (11th Cir . 1983) , ££££. £eju£d_, 464 
U.S. 896 (1983); O'Bryan v . E s t e l l e . 714 F.2d 365, 383-84 (5th 
Cir . 1983); Johnson v . Harris . 682 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir . 1982) , 
CfiJLt. d£Hi£d_, 459 U.S. 1041 (1982) . 
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The Tenth Circui t apparently found s u f f i c i e n t ambiguity 
in Morishita to allow the court to reach the merits of the case . 
To avoid any such presumption in the ins tant case respondent 
urges that t h i s Court firmly s t a t e that i t s holding i s based upon 
procedural d e f a u l t , not the meri ts , and that any d i scuss ion of 
the merits should not be construed as an a l ternate holding of the 
c a s e , but only d i c t im. 
Should t h i s Court reach the mer i t s , the dec i s ion of the 
t r i a l court i s e n t i t l e d to a presumption of correc tness : 
When the i s sues have been tr ied and the t r i a l 
court has found against [the p e t i t i o n e r ] , we 
survey the record in the l i g h t most favorable 
to the f indings and judgment; and we w i l l not 
reverse i f there i s a reasonable bas is 
therein to support the t r i a l cour t ' s re fusa l 
to be convinced that the writ should be 
granted. 
Velasquez v. Pra t t . 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 
(1968) . £££. a lso Maxwell v . Turner. 20 Utah 2d 163, 435 P.2d 287 
(1967) . Once the p e t i t i o n e r has been convicted of a crime, the 
presumption of innocence and other protect ions afforded an 
accused no longer apply and a presumption in favor of the 
propriety of the proceedings and the judgment takes over, with 
the burden of showing to the contrary upon the p l a i n t i f f . Price 
v . Turner. 28 Utah 2d 328, 330, 502 P.2d 121 , 122 (1972). 
Judge B i l l i n g ' s f indings as re f l ec ted in her Memorandum 
Decis ion and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Appendix B) 
are to be accorded a presumption of correc tnes s . Pe t i t i oner has 
f a i l e d to overcome t h i s presumption by demonstrating that there 
was no reasonable bas i s for the Court's f ind ings . Although 
p e t i t i o n e e s claims received great deference throughout the 
habeas corpus t r i a l ("He may t e l l h is story", HT 108) , the 
a l l e g a t i o n s he made were u l t imate ly supported only by h i s own 
s e l f-serv ing tes timony. 
The following arguments contained in po in t s II through 
V are argued in the a l t erna t ive assuming t h i s Court decides to 
reach the merits of p e t i t i o n e r ' s appeal* 
POINT II 
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL OR ON APPEAL. 
P e t i t i o n e r claims that: h i s t r i a l counsel was 
i n e f f e c t i v e because: 1) he did not use h i s bes t e f f o r t s a t 
t r i a l ; 2) he refused to i n v e s t i g a t e p e t i t i o n e r ' s case ; and 3) he 
f a i l e d to make objec t ions and argue the f a c t s a t t r i a l (App. Br. 
at 7-8) . 
P e t i t i o n e r c i t e s Shiprnan v . Gladden. 453 P.2d 921 (Or. 
1969) and A l i r e s v . Turner. 449 P.2d 241 (Utah 1969) , in support 
of h i s p o s i t i o n , however ignores t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n in 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983) . There, t h i s Court 
s tated that before a conv ic t ion i s s e t aside on the bas i s of 
i n e f f e c t i v e counse l , Utah courts must examine the fol lowing 
p r i n c i p a l s : 
(1) The burden of e s tab l i sh ing inadequate 
representat ion i s on the defendant, "and 
proof of such must be a demonstrable r e a l i t y 
and not a specu la t ive matter." State v . 
McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976) . 
(2) A lawyer's " legi t imate e x e r c i s e of 
s trategy or t a c t i c s that did not produce the 
ant ic ipated r e s u l t does not c o n s t i t u t e 
i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s tance of counse l ." McNicol» 
554 P.2d at 205. 
(3) I t must appear that any de f i c i ency in the 
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performance of counsel was p r e j u d i c i a l . ££&££ 
v . Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 f 339 (Utah 1977); JaramiUo Vt Turner# 24 Utah 2d I9 f 22, 465 
P.2d 343, 345 (1970). In t h i s context , 
prejudice means that without c o u n s e l f s error 
there was a "reasonable l ike l ihood that there 
would have been a d i f f eren t r e s u l t . . . ." 
State v . Gray, 601 P.2d I 918] , at 920 I(Utah 
1979)1 . S imi lar ly , as we noted in State v . 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 156), at 58 [(Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ] , 
"the f a i l u r e of counsel to make motions or 
object ions which would be f u t i l e i f raised 
does not c o n s t i t u t e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . " 
Codianna. 660 P.2d at 1109. Furthermore, under Strickland v . 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) adopted by t h i s Court in State v. 
Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) , the Court s tated that : 
The defendant must show that there i s a 
reasonable probabi l i ty tha t , but for 
counse l ' s unprofessional errors , the r e s u l t 
of the proceeding would have been d i f f e r e n t . 
A reasonable probabi l i ty i s a probabi l i ty 
s u f f i c i e n t to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. 
In making t h i s determination, a court hearing 
an i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s claim must consider the 
t o t a l i t y of the evidence before the judge or 
jury. . . . [A] court making the prejudice 
inquiry must ask i f the defendant has met the 
burden of showing that the dec i s ion reached 
would reasonably l i k e l y have been d i f f e r e n t 
absent the errors . 
Strickland v . Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694-696 (1984) . 
Thus, defendant has the burden of proving that any 
de t i c i ency in the performance of his counsel was prejudic ia l and 
that without the errors there was a reasonable l ike l ihood of a 
d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t -
Pe t i t i oner a l l e g e s that h i s t r i a l counsel was 
i n e f f e c t i v e for three s p e c i f i c reasons . F i r s t , he claims that 
h i s attorney was nervous and pre-occupied and f a i l e d to appear 
for appointments. The record does not corroborate petitioner's 
assertions that trial counsel's manner was "agitated, nervous or 
preoccupied." Neither does it support his contention that trial 
counsel "failed to appear for appointments or perform tasks which 
he indicated would be done*" Instead, trial counsel's testimony 
indicates that he met with petitioner on numerous occasions, 
approximately 10 to 15 times, and gave him copies ot the police 
reports and the transcript of the preliminary hearing to review 
(HT 127). 
Second, petitioner claims that his attorney failed to 
investigate his case. As the Court stated in j^ jLicJslflMLYjL 
KaShinstOn* 466 U.S. 668 (1983): 
[Sltrategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable; and strategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that 
reasonable professional judgments support the 
limitations on investigation. In other 
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary. 
The reasonableness of counsel's actions 
may be determined or substantially intluenced 
by the defendant's own statements or actions. 
Counsel's actions are usually based, quite 
properly, on informed strategic choices made 
by the defendant and on information supplied 
by the defendant. In particular, what 
investigation decisions are reasonable 
depends critcally on such information. For 
example, when the facts tnat support a 
certain potential line ot defense are 
generally known to counsel because of wnat 
the defendant has said, the need for further 
investigation may be considerably diminished 
or eliminated altogether. And when a 
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defendant has given counsel reason to believe 
that pursuing certain investigations would be 
fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure 
to pursue those investigations may not later 
be challenged as unreasonable. 
ifl. at 690-91. 
The record indicates that petitioner's attorney 
performed a signiticant amount of investigation including review 
of police records (HT 127, 129) and attempts to find petitioner's 
travelling companions (HT 130). Trial counsel was unable to find 
any witnesses to testify on petitioner's behalf because 
petitioner never gave trial counsel a list of witnesses to locate 
(HT 130)• Petitioner himself testified that he gave a rough 
description of two witnesses to trial counsel which was 
inadequate to locate the witnesses and that "I (petitioner) 
couldn't find them myself if I wanted." (HT 111). 
Finally, petitioner claims that his attorney failed to 
make objections and argue the facts of the case at trial. One ot 
his complaints is that trial counsel did not object when Chris 
Lybert testified for the State. Ms. Lybert was permitted to 
remain in the courtroom during the preliminary hearing atter the 
Judge had invoked the exclusionary rule for witnesses. She 
appparently claimed at the preliminary hearing that she would not 
be testifying at the trial, however later testified. 
Petitioner's argument that his attorney failed to make objections 
is without merit since he admitted at the habeas hearing tnat his 
attorney did object to Ms. Lybert's testimony (HT 98, 112). 
Further, petitioner admitted tnat trial counsel asked 
the questions requested by petitioner (HT 109); that 
inconsistencies in the apartment manager's testimony were brought 
to the attention of the jury (HT 112 citing to CT 143-158); tnat 
conflicting testimony regarding the use of the scanner was 
brought to the attention of the jury, defense counsel even 
attempted to demonstrate the scanner to the jury but was 
curtailed by the trial court (HT 132-33); and finally, trial 
counsel attempted to demonstrate that the coat found on 
petitioner at the time of the arrest was too large for him (HT 
133;. All ot these are facts ot the case which petitioner claims 
should have been argued at trial. 
Because the record disputes all claims raised by 
defendant, his arguments are without merit and Judge Billings1 
finding that trial counsel's "cited deficiencies, neither 
individually nor cumulatively, rise to the level of ineffective 
assistance ot counsel" (HT 74) , should be affirmed by this Court. 
Petitioner also claims he was denied the right to an 
etfective appeal (App. Br. Point V at 13). Specifically, he 
alleges that appellate counsel failed to argue: 1) trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness; 2) the trial court's erroneous 
decision in not allowing petitioner to turn on the scanner, and 
3) the erroneous decision of the trial court in permitting the 
apartment manager's wife to testify at trial. 
At the habeas hearing Judge Billings declined to rule 
on appellate counsel's effectiveness stating tnat: 
The Court finds that she need not address the 
issue of petitioner's ineffective appeal 
claim since the Court found that petitioner 
had effective assistance of counsel at trial, 
and petitioner's ineffective appeal claim was 
based on petitioner's claim tnat his trial 
counsel was ineffective. 
Petitioner M complaints regarding appellate counsel are 
unsupportable. Appellate counsel's decision not to raise the 
issue ol effectiveness of trial counsel was a conscious, tactical 
decision made in consultation with petitioner and subject to his 
approval (HT 119). Petitioner acknowledged being informed that 
the issue ol attorney misconduct during the criminal trial was 
not supported in the record (HT 106)• Finally, appei late counsel 
did not raise all issues requested by petitioner because of 
insufficient evidence in tfn record (HT 121)• The record 
indicates the trial judge did permit petitioner to turn on the 
scanner (HT 132-33). The record also provides that trial counsel 
did object ot the testimony by the apartment manager1s wife (HT 
98f 112). 
Petitionees final argument that appellate counsel did 
not permit him to participate in the appeal is also without 
merit. Although Mr* Gaither, counsel on appeal, never personally 
met with petitioner, he talked with him numerous times on the 
phone (HT 118)• He discussed the issues with petit ioner (HT 
118); prepared a draft of the brief for petitioner to review (HT 
119); and oM. a inert pet >tloner's approval of the brief (HT 119, 
122) . 
In sum, all issues raised by petitioner are disputed 
by the record. Assuming some eirors were present at trial or on 
appeal, petitioner has failed to prove that such errors were 
prejudicial and that t*^  result of the trial on appeal would have 
been different without - s. 
2QIBI.IU 
THE PROSECUTOR DID MOT WITHHOLD EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE OR USE PERJURED EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. 
Petitioner claims that prosecutorial error prejudiced 
his chances at trial. Specitically, he alleges the prosecutor 
failed to provide him with exculpatory evidence when the State 
failed: 1) to investigate the crime; 2) to provide petitioner 
with the name ot an apartment resident who claimed someone 
attempted to break in her apartment the same night petitioner was 
arrested; 3) to peforra a sobriety test on petitioner; and 4) to 
provide petitioner with a fingerprint report prior to trial* 
Additionally, petitioner alleges that the prosecutor used 
perjured testimony. 
Petitioner cites jSiSifi-^ -Bfitffii), 449 P.2d 603 (Ariz. 
1969) , and people v. Hitch, 527 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1974) , for 
standards of prosecutorial conduct and ignores the standard ot 
review for prosecutorial misconduct established by this Court. 
In Stgjg^y^JflrifilI * 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980) this Court adopted 
the ruling in ypitS<3_StfltSS_^-ftgUESr 427 U.S. 97 (1976): 
&3UJLS concerned the duty of a prosecutor to 
disclose exculpatory evidence which is 
unknown and unrequested by the defendant. 
The Court held that a prosecutor has a 
constitutional duty to volunteer obviously 
exculpatory evidence and evidence that is "so 
clearly supportive ol: a claim of innocence 
that it gives the prosecution notice of a 
duty to produce," 427 U.S. at 107f 96 S.Ct. 
at 2399. Specifically, the Court held that 
due process is violated if the undisclosed 
evidence, had it been disclosed, would have 
created a reasonable doubt as to defendant's 
guilt. Whether the evidence created a 
reasonable doubt must be evaluated in light 
of the entire record as viewed by an 
appellate court: 
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If there is no reasonable doubt 
about guilt whether or not the 
additional evidence is considered, 
there is no justification for a 
new trial* On the other handf if 
the verdict is already of question-
able validity, additional evidence 
of relatively minor importance 
might be sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt* lid^r at 112-113, 
96 S.Ct. at 2402) 
A fair minded prosecutor is not likely to be 
aware of all potential evidence which a 
defendant may think relevant, and we do not 
think it reasonable, given the adversary 
nature of the criminal process, to require a 
prosecutor to disclose all evidence which 
might possibly be usetul to the defense but 
which is not likely to have a foreseeable 
effect upon the verdict* Such a requirement 
would create unbearable burdens and also 
uncertainties with respect to the finality ot; 
judgments. 
J&LJL§11# 608 P.2d at 224-5 (footnote om 11 ted) . Sge £l£2 Stat? y« 
gh3bfrt;a, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
U.S. _ , 1 t. 989, 1001 (1987). In State v. Shatfer, 725 
P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) this Court noted: 
[clonstitutional materiality requires 
that there be a showing tnat the 
suppressed or destroyed evidence is 
vital to the issues of whether the 
defendant is guilty ot the charge and 
whether there is a fundamental unfair-
ness that requires the Court to set 
aside the defendants conviction. A 
corollary of this proposition is, 
"The mere £fl££ibiljL£y that an item 
ot undisclosed information might have 
helped the defense, or miskt have 
affected the outcome ot the trail does 
not establish 'materiality1 in the 
constitutional sense." 
Id. at U 0 5 (citations omitted). Finally, the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence by the prosecution does not violate due 
process where such evidence is •tangential or cumulative." 
Cfidianna-^ jL-ItelXifi# 660 P.2d at llOl, 108 (Utah 1983). 
Petitioner argues that the failure of the police to 
•adequately investigate" the crime, adminster a sobriety test, 
investigate his allegations of a concurrent burglary in another 
part of the building, and investigate "pry marks" "indicates a 
quick fix attitude on the part of investigators and no real 
desire to find the responsible parties" (App. Br. 11). 
There is no generalized duty of the prosecution "to 
search for exculpatory evidence, conduct tests, or exhaustively 
pursue every angle on a case." State vft Sftaff^ i;, 725 P.2d 13 01, 
1306 (Utah 1986) diing gfcaifi__y^HaUr 22 Wash.App. 862, 867, 593 
P.2d 554, 558 (1979). A standard "which would impose a duty on 
the prosecution to search for all relevant evidence, would 
require Herculean effort by the prosecution." Sfraffg£, 725 P.2d 
at 1306. Likewise there should be no duty placed on the 
prosecution of this case to engage in heroic investigative 
techniques in order to provide the defense with evidence not 
relevant to a changed result. 
The relevance of pry marks on other doors in the 
apartment complex is not clear, since petitioner was found inside 
the apartment, admitted he entered without consent (CT 180, 302-
03), and he possessed burglar tools consistent with the marks on 
the dryers (CT 126-27, 182 fiJt J5£S*)-
Petitioner's argument that the Prosecutor failed to 
provide him with the name of a witness who complained about an 
attempted burglary of her apartment is without merit. There is 
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no evidence in the record, nor has any new evidence been 
presented by petitionee that would point t« fbe existence of a 
secret state witness* Furthermore, petitioner has not shown that 
prosecutors were aware of such a witness* He did not provide the 
witness1 name, yet claims to be aware of his/her existence* To 
ascribe to the prosecution a duty to volunteer information 
petitioner must, under JfliX£llr she >w that the testimony of this 
witness gave "notice" to the prosecutor of its exculpatory nature 
•clearly support! ive] ot a claim of innocence". jJilLLeHf 608 
P.2d 224-5. Without notice, the prosecutors were nut able, JIIU" In, 
less under duty, to volunteer information to petitioner. 
Judge Bin HI is review of the evidence pointed to the 
"tangential" value of an unnamed witness at the apartment house 
(HT 75). The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the evidence was 
sufficient for a conviction. gjfca^ g_ yJL_PoitgC r 705 P.2d 1174, 
1177-78 (Utah 1985). The mere possibility that the unnamed 
witness could have given some exculpatory evidence sufficient to 
overcome the basis for the Supreme Court•s r u 1 ing is not 
sufficient to meet the standards in this state. It is up to 
defendant to make this demonstration. £jefi S£aJL£_it~51iaiLf£Ir 725 
P.2d, at ISO1;). Judge Billings dismissed petitioner's claim -;! 
denial of compulsory service of process due to the lack of a 
definitive showing, and "because there Iwas] no evidence that he 
relied upon representations that the State would calI such 
witness" (HT 78). 
• Fur thei , the poJ ic/p did not have a duty to give 
petitioner a sobriety test, it is the duty of the State to prove 
every element of the crime. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-
203(1)(c)(1978) provides: 
A person is guilty ot aggravated burglary if 
in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a 
burglary, the actor or another participant in 
the crime: • • . (c) is armed with a deadly 
weapon or possesses or attempts to use any 
explosive or deadly weapon. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202(1)(1978) provides that: 
A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit a 
felony or thett or commit an assault on any 
person. 
Intent to commit burglary may be inferred from the 
conduct of the defendant. S&& £i£Lt£_XjL.J§iSD£££S# 728 P.2d 113 
(Utah 1986)(intent may be inferred where defendant breaks and 
enters a building in the nighttime, without consent); gtafcfi-Y^  
HiLSfiUr 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985)(intent may be inferred from 
evidence that defendant broke a window to gain entry into a 
locked building, even though nothing was missing); Staie^Y* 
!£££££££# 704 P.2d 555 (Utah 1985)(intent may be inferred from 
evidence that the defendant was halfway into an apartment, 
intending to find a place to get warm). 
This Court found intent could be inferred to Mr. 
Porter. 
The jury was at liberty to infer from the 
fact that defendant had entered the laundry 
room to commit a thett, that such may have 
been his intent when entered apartment 205. 
EiJJLtfiif 705 P.2d 1177. Intoxication would be relevant if it 
prevented the petitioner from having the specitic intent to 
commit thett and burglary. 5fi£ Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-202, 76-6-
-22-
404,; To prove he lacked specific intent, petitioner must show 
more than the fact that he had been drinking prior to the 
commission of the crime. He must "show that his mind had been 
affected to such an extent liui be did not have the capacity to 
form the requisite specific intent or purpose* to commit 
burglary.. Stalfi. £J; Jfflf ldr 6 4 8 P . 2 d 7 1 , 8 9 - 9 0 ( U t a h 1 9 8 2 ) , £ £ £ * . 
d£ELi££i 4 5 9 U . S . 9 88 ( 1 9 8 2 ) Ti u s lie has fa i I ed t o do . 
Sutficient evidence that petitioner was not intoxicated was 
presented at trial (CT 181, 234). The prosecutor was under no 
duty to administer a sobriety test and petitioner has failed to 
prove such a test would have enculpated him. 
Petit ioner also argues that the prosecutor did not 
provide a report of whether petitioner's fingerprints were found 
on the gun. Petitioner has provided no evidence of a request for 
a fingerprint report or evidence that any report would have 
exculpated him. 
Finally, petitioner claims the prosecutor intentionally 
used perjured testimony. He claims that the prosecutor either 
knew or should have known that the scanner testimony given by the 
police officers would be inconsistent; that the prosecutor 
intentionally misled the jury, claiming the scanner was a "police 
radio" when he knew it was not; and tnat the prosecutor knew the 
pictures and didwings introduced at trial weie erroneous. 
A conviction obtained by the use ol periurcd testimony 
must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the 
false testimony coul d have affected the judgment of the jury: 
[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use 
perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair 
and must be set aside if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of 
the jury. 
JaJLEfilif 608 P.2d at 224 ciiina &3EiJ£_^_IIlin£iS # 360 U.S. 264 
(1959). 5££ Alfifi fifidiaflDa* 660 P.2d at 1106; H.fllJS£I_i*_Sifli£, 
624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1980). Petitioner has not shown that 
allegedly perjured testimony would have changed the result in the 
instant case. Without such a showing, the findings of the jury 
are entitled to a presumption of correctness: 
In reviewing a defendant's conviction, we do 
not substitute our judgment for that of the 
jury. Sifli£_JU_£££]S££, 709 P.2d 342f 345 
(Utah 1985). It is the exclusive function of 
the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of witnesses. 
Stfrte y. Un<3erwggdr 737 P.2d 995, 996 (Utah 1987). 
Petitioner's claims of perjury are instead only 
discrepancies in testimony which go to the weight ot the evidence 
before the jury. The police officers1 testimony regarding the 
scanner is of marginal relevance. Petitioner maintains their 
testimony was false and prejudicial. He alleges that their 
•perjury" regarding the scanner left the jury with the impression 
that petitioner was a habitual criminal. Petitioner evidently 
believes that had the scanner evidence been presented 
differently, it would outweigh the testimony of five witnesses, 
his unexplainable presence in the apartment, and the fact that 
police officers found other burglar tools in petitioner's 
possession, including lock picks and vise grip pliers (CT 192, 
193, 231, 249-54, 309). These tools were directly implicated in 
the events leading to petitioner's arrest and conviction. The 
scanner was not. 
-24-
Furthermore, petitioner admitted that the scanner was 
capable of picking up police frequencies (HI 10 0),, There was 
ample testimony concerning the notebook found in petitioner's 
possession ai id the police frequencies it contained (CT 199-203). 
From this evidence the jury was free to conclude that the scanner 
was being used for criminal purposes and as an aid to petitioner 
•in the crime oi burglary. 
2QIKE-IY 
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED COMPULSORY PROCESS 
• 'Petitioner claims that another apar tment resident in 
the building complained of an attempted burglary the same evening 
petitioner was found in the apartment. Petitioner argues that if 
he had been able to call that resident as a witness,- It w :>u] d 
have assisted his defense that a third party committed the 
burglary in thr .laundry room (App. Br. at 12). 
Againf petitioner does not identify who the witness was 
and how petitioner was denied compulsory process. As Mr. Valdez, 
trial' counsel, testified, petitioner never gave him a list of 
witnesses (HT 130). 
Finally, it is not clear that the testimony by this 
witness would have exculpated petitioner. A witness testifying 
that she heard pry marks at her door, without more, is hardly 
sufficient to clear petitioner of the charged crimes. According 
to Mr. Valdez the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing was 
very damaging to petitioner and the case was extremely difficult 
to detend (HT 127-29). As this Court stated in Mr. Porter's 
appeal: 
The testimony of five witnesses called by the 
State and the circumstantial evidence, i.e., 
defendant's manner of entry into apartment 
205, the lateness of the hour, defendant's 
explanation to the police officers, "You have 
got me. What more can I say?" and the 
totality of the surrounding circumstances 
provide sufficient bases to support the jury 
verdict* 
PETITIONER WAS NOT DENIED THE RIGHT TO 
PRESENT SCANNER EVIDENCE 
Petitioner claims that the trial court refused to allow 
him to turn on the scanner for the jury. As argued in Point II, 
&UBL&9 petitioner was permitted to play the scanner (HT 132-33), 
and even testified concerning the scanner (CT 304) • This Court 
further ruled on the sutticiency of evidence at the criminal 
trial; among this evidence was the scanner (HT exhibits 5-D, 
"Brief of Appellant on direct appeal, at 22"). 
The decision of the trial judge regarding the scanner 
was addressed in petitioner's appeal and is now res judicata for 
purposes of the present action. 
CQBG1&SIQS 
Based on the foregoing arguments, respondent requests 
this court to affirm the lower court's denial ot the petition. 
DATED this rO day of September, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
26-
£E£TJFICAT£_0£_£A:U,I1£ 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid to 
Phil Jones, «H0 South bieitu, Suite 10, Oiem, Utah 84057, this _^L 




1174 U u h 705 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM and ZIM-
MERMAN, J., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
(o f i i t M M i M H t i O 
dating that only one conviction may be 
obtained if the tame act of defendant may 
be punished under different criminal provi-
sions; and (7) trial judge appropriately ex-
ercised his discretion by not allowing de-
fendant to cross-examine State's expert 
witness in an improper manner. 
Affirmed. 
if 
STATE of UUh, PlaintlfT and 
Respondent, 
• . 
Stephen Wayne PORTER, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 20149. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 29, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Ernest 
Baldwin, J., of aggravated burglary of an 
apartment burglary of a laundry room, 
and theft and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court Howe, J., held that (1) judge's addi-
tional instruction, given after jury had re-
tired and sought clarification, was authoriz-
ed where it clarified a point of law; (2) 
additional instruction in response to jury's 
question of whether acts and conduct con-
nected specifically with apartment or also 
with previous events, what the defendant 
might have done in laundry room of apart-
ment building, could be considered, that 
jury could consider all evidence presented 
to it for determination of aggravated bur-
glary was not an improper clarification; (3) 
additional instruction was not a comment 
on the evidence because it did not advise 
jury on weight to be given any particular 
hem of evidence; (4) jury could infer from 
fact that defendant had entered secured 
laundry room to commit theft that such 
might have been his intent when he entered 
apartment in aame building; (5) evidence 
supported aggravated burglary conviction; 
(6) defendant's actions did not constitute a 
single crime, for purposes of statute man-
1. Criminal Law e»863(2) 
Additional jury instruction by judge, 
after jury had retired for deliberation and 
sought clarification of instruction, was au-
thorized by Rule 17(m), where instruction 
clarified a point of law. U.C.A.1953, 77-
3&-17(m). 
2. Criminal Law e»745 
Inference goes to trier of fact to be 
weighed along with the contravening evi-
dence, in that such inference, like all infer-
ences capable of being drawn from evi-
dence intrinsically containing the seeds 
from which logical deductions may be 
made, rests on basic facts which remain in 
the case. 
3. Burglary *»41(3) 
Intent with which entry is made, for 
purposes of burglary, is rarely susceptible 
of direct proof, but is usually inferred from 
circumstantial evidence such as the manner 
of entry, the time of day, the character and 
contents of building, person's actions after 
entry, totality of the surrounding circum-
atances, and intruder's explanation. 
4. Burglary *»41<3) 
Where breaking and entering are 
clearly established and not controverted, 
intent to steal, for purposes of burglar}*, 
may be sufficiently established by infer-
ence fairly deducible from all the circum-
stances and need not be established by 
direct proof. 
ft. Criminal Law +»8*3(2) 
Judge's additional instruction in bur-
glary prosecution, after jury had retired 
and sought clarification of whether infer 
ences from acts and conduct were to be 
connected specifically with apartment ID 
STATE v 
which defendant was found or also with 
previous events, such as what he might 
hive done in laundry room of same build-
ing, that jury could consider all of the 
evidence presented to them for a determi-
nation of aggravated burglary was not an 
improper clarification. 
1 Criminal Law *»8*3(2) 
Judge's instruction in burglary prose-
cution, after jury had retired and sought 
clarification of what circumstances might 
be considered in determining burglarious 
intent, was not a comment on the evidence, 
where it did not advise jury on weight to be 
given any particular item of evidence. 
7. Burglary •»** 
Jury in burglary prosecution was at 
Kberty to infer from fact that defendant 
had entered secured laundryroom in apart-
ment building to commit a theft that such 
might hsve been his intent when he entered 
apartment in the same building. U.C.A. 
1953, 76^-203. 
& Burglary *»4M) 
Evidence as to defendant's manner of 
entry into apartment by picking lock, late-
ness of the hour, defendant's explanation 
to police officers that they had him and 
what could he say, and totality of sur-
rounding circumstances supported aggra-
vated burglary conviction. U.C.A.1953, 7S-
6-203. 
I. Burglary «=»4 
Defendant unlawfully entered two sep-
arate buildings, under U.C.A.1953, 76-6-
201, defining "building," for purposes of 
burglary, where laundry room and apart-
ment were separately secured portions of 
apartment building and defendant unlaw-
fully entered both of them. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definition* 
16. Burglary #»4 
Neither "building" that defendant en-
tered, secured laundry room and apart-
ment, was required to be a "dwelling" to 
support burglsry convictions; character of 
building is important only in determining 
. PORTER Utah H 7 5 
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whether burglary is a felony of the second 
or third degree. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-202(2), 
76-6-203. 
11. Burglary #»4 
Defendant's conviction for burglary of 
laundry room for third-degree felony did 
not require entry into a dwelling. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-S~202<2). 
12. Burglary #»10 
Aggravated burglary, of which defend-
ant was convicted for unlawful entry into 
apartment, was first-degree felony regard-
less of whether a dwelling was involved; 
where defendant's possession of a gun dur-
ing the burglary was the determining 
factor establishing aggravated burglary. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-203. 
13. Criminal Law *»29 
Defendant's actions in unlawfully en-
tering secured laundry room and apart-
ment within same apartment building did 
not constitute a single crime, for purposes 
of U.C.A.1953, 7&-1-402U), mandating that 
only one conviction may be obtained if the 
same act of a defendant may be punished 
under different criminal provisions, where 
evidence was sufficient for jury to have 
inferred that defendant possessed requisite 
intent when he entered each of the sepa-
rately secured portions of the apartment 
house; although defendant's crimes were 
committed during a single criminal episode, 
he committed two distinct burglaries sepa-
rately punishable. U.C.A.1953, 7G-1-401. 
14. Criminal Law *»489 
Trial judge appropriately exercised his 
discretion by not allowing defendant to 
cross-examine State's expert witness in an 
improper manner, despite defendant's con-
stitutional right to represent himself and to 
control his own defense, where judge did 
not preclude defendant from questioning 
witness, but stopped defendant from ask-
ing questions on cross-examination that 
were outside scope of direct examination 
and expressly reserved for defendant right 
to call expert as his own witness. 
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Edward Brass & Randall Gaither, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Sandra J. 
Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and respondent 
HOWE, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from jury convictions 
of aggravated burglary of an apartment, in 
violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-203; bur-
glary of a laundry room, in violation of 
U.C.A., 1953, { 76-6-202; and theft, in vio-
lation of U.C.A., 1953, { 76-6-404. He 
seeks to have the verdicts set aside or, in 
the alternative, to be awarded a new trial. 
Shortly after midnight on February 22, 
J984, the manager of an apartment com-
plex in Salt Lake City looked through a 
peephole in his apartment door and saw 
defendant picking the lock on the door to 
apartment 205 directly across the hall. 
The manager called the police. They ar-
rived fifteen minutes later, entered apart-
ment 205, and found defendant lying on the 
floor with an army jacket draped over his 
legs. The police searched the jacket and 
found a loaded pistol and approximately 
twenty-one dollars in dimes. They also 
searched a red knapsack belonging to de-
fendant which contained lock picks, a black 
notebook, a pair of vise grips, a pair of 
needlenose pliers, a set of keys, a list of 
radio frequencies, and other miscellaneous 
items. Strapped to defendant's waist was 
a radio scanner tuned to the frequency 
used by the local police. When the officers 
asked defendant his name and his purpose 
tor being in the apartment, he responded 
with a false name and aaid, "You have got 
me. What more can I aay?M 
Later that morning, at approximately 
7:00 a.m., the manager and his wife went to 
the laundry room to remove the money 
from the coin-operated washing machines. 
The door to the laundry room was normally 
locked, and only the manager, tenants, and 
owners had keys. The manager inspected 
the washers and found metal shavings un-
der several of the coin boxes, noting that 
the area around the keyholes had been 
Stripped with some metal device." He 
also observed that one coin box was dis-
lodged and empty, although it would nor-
mally contain between twenty and thirty 
dollars when serviced. 
At trial, defendant testified that the 
army jacket did not belong to him, but that 
he had mistakenly picked it up from a truck 
he had helped push-start on the night of 
the burglary. He also testified that he had 
only recently arrived in the Salt Lake City 
area. However, the manager's wife testi-
fied that she had seen him in a storage 
room of the complex nearly two months 
earlier. On that occasion, he was wearing 
a green army jacket 
Defendant testified that he heard from 
persons whose truck he had earlier helped 
push-start that apartment 205 was vacant 
He also testified that he entered the apart-
ment only to warm himself and to sleep. 
The manager testified that although he 
was not sure that the mailbox for apart-
ment 205 had a name on it, he was sure 
that the apartment director}' always 
showed names for every apartment, even 
those that were vacant 
ADDITIONAL JURY INSTRUCTION 
The principal issue for us to determine is 
whether the trial court gave a correct in-
atruction when, after retiring for delibera-
tion, the jury sought clarification of the 
intent required for conviction of aggrava-
ted burglary. The trial judge's instruction 
No. 12 to the jury accurately defined bur-
glary as found in U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-202: 
UA person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any 
portion of a building with intent to commit 
a felony or theft or commit an assault on 
any person.** Instruction No. 18 estab-
lished the method whereby the jury was to 
determine whether defendant had the spe-
cific intent required for conviction of bur-
glary and aggravated burglary: 
18. The intent with which an act is done 
denotes a state of mind and connotes a 
purpose in so acting. Intent being a 
state of mind is seldom susceptible of 
proof by direct and positive evidence and 
STATE • 
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must ordinarily be inferred from acta, 
conduct, statements, and circumstances. 
Thus, you would be justified in inferring 
that a person must have intended the 
natural and probable consequences of 
any act purposely done by him. 
(1,2) After the jurors had retired for 
deliberation, they informed the judge by 
message that they desired to be further 
instructed. Specifically, the jury asked the 
judge, "Instruction Number 18 where it 
says, 'infers from the acts, conduct, and 
statements and circumstances,' are these 
the acts and conduct connected specifically 
with Apartment 205, or also with previous 
events, what the person may have done in 
the laundryroom?" The judge responded 
in writing. "You may consider all conduct 
of the defendant on the premises on Febru-
ary 22, 1984." Defendant contends that 
this additional instruction constituted an 
impermissible comment on the evidence. 
The additional instruction was authorized 
by Rule 17(m) of the Utah Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, $ 77-3S-
17(m), because it clarified a point of law 
regarding how the jury may infer an ac-
tor's intent 
We have defined an "inference" as: 
a logical and reasonable conclusion of the 
existence of a fact in the case, not 
presented by direct evidence as to the 
existence of the fact itself, but inferred 
from the establishment of other facts 
from which, by the process of logic and 
reason, based upon common experience, 
the existence of the assumed fact may be 
concluded by the trier of the fact 
Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 109, 239 
P2d 193, 198-99 (1951). An inference goes 
to the trier of fact to be weighed along 
with the contravening evidence because 
such inference, like all inferences capable 
of being drawn from evidence intrinsically 
containing the seeds from which logical 
deductions may be made, rests on basic 
facts which remain in the case. Id. at 110, 
239 P.2d at 198-99. 
(3] Burglarious intent "is a mental 
state of the actor. [T]he trier of fact must 
resort to reasonable inferences based upon 
. PORTER Uuh H77 
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[an] examination of the surrounding cir-
cumstances to reasonably infer its exist-
ence." Farno v. State, 159 Ind.App. 627, 
629, 308 N.E.2d 724, 725 (1974); see State 
v. Sisneros, Utah, 631 P.2d 856 (1981); 
State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.2d 
486 (1961); $ee also State v. Brooks, Utah, 
631 P.2d 878 (1981); State v. Tellay, 7 
Utah 2d 308, 324 P.2d 490 (1958). Intent 
with which an entry is made is rarely sus-
ceptible of direct proof. It is ususlly in-
ferred from circumstantial evidence: the 
manner of entry, the time of day, the char-
acter and contents of the building, the per-
son's actions after entry, the totality of the 
surrounding circumstances, and the intrud-
er's explanation. See 12A CJ.S., Burglary 
§§ 85 and 104; 13 AmJur.2d, Burglary 
§ 52. 
[4-7] Where the breaking and entering 
are clearly established and not controvert-
ed, the intent to steal may be sufficiently 
established by inference fairly deducible 
from all the circumstances and need not be 
established by direct proof. As a result in 
the present fact situation, the judge's addi-
tional instruction that the jury could consid-
er all of the evidence presented to them for 
a determination of aggravated burglary 
was not an improper clarification. Like 
wise, it was not a comment on the evidence 
because it did not advise the jury on the 
weight to be given any particular item of 
evidence. The jury was at liberty to infer 
from the fact that defendant had entered 
the laundry room to commit a theft that 
such msy have been his intent when he 
entered apartment 205. 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
[8] Defendant also contends that the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain 
an aggravated burglary verdict We dis-
agree. The testimony of five witnesses 
called by the State and the circumstantial 
evidence, ie.t defendant's manner of entry 
into apartment 205, the lateness of the 
hour, defendant's explanation to the police 
officers, "You have got me. What more 
can I say?" and the totality of the sur-
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rounding circumstances provide sufficient 
bases to support the jury verdict 
TWO SEPARATE OFFENSES 
Defendant contends that the trial court 
erred by instructing the jury that he could 
be convicted of two separate burglary of-
fenses involving the same building. He 
asserts that the incidents in the laundry 
room and apartment 205 were part of a 
single criminal episode, that neither of the 
involved areas constituted dwellings, and 
that U.C.A., 1953, J 76-1-402(1) mandates 
that only one conviction may be obtained if 
the same act of a defendant may be pun-
ished under different provisions of the 
criminal code. 
(9] Defendant unlawfully entered into 
the secured laundry room where he stole 
the dimes from the dryer. He then wan-
dered through the apartment house for al-
most twenty minutes before breaking into 
apartment 205. Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, 
{ 7&-6-201, " 'Building* in addition to its 
ordinary meaning, means any . . . structure 
. . . adapted for overnight accommodation 
or for carrying on business therein and 
includes: (1) Each separately secured or 
occupied portion of the structure " 
Both the laundry room and apartment 205 
were separately secured portions of the 
apartment house. Therefore, under the 
statute, defendant unlawfully entered two 
separate buildings. 
(10-12) Neither "building0 that defend-
ant entered was required to be a "dwell-
ing" to support burglary convictions. As 
clearly stated in U.C.A., 1953, f 76-6-
202(2), the character of the building is im-
portant only in determining whether the 
burglary is a felony of the second or third 
degree. Defendant's conviction for burgla-
ry of the laundry room was for the lesser 
third degree felony. It did Dot require 
entry into a dwelling. Aggravated burgla-
ry, the crime for which defendant was con-
victed for his unlawful entry into apart-
ment 205, is a first degree felony regard-
less of whether a dwelling is involved. 
U.C.A., 1953, | 76-6-203. Defendant's 
possession of a gun during the burglary 
was the determining factor establishing ag-
gravated burglary. 
(13] Defendant's actions did not consti-
tute a single crime. Neither section 7&-1-
401 nor our holding in State v. Bair, Utah, 
671 P.2d 203 (1983), mandates that we so 
hold. The evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to have inferred that defendant pos-
sessed the requisite intent when he entered 
each of the separately secured portions of 
the apartment house. The provision in sec-
tion 76-1-402(1) against double punishment 
for a single act is inapplicable here. Al-
though defendant's crimes were committed 
during a single criminal episode, he com-
mitted two distinct burglaries separately, 
punishable under section 7&-1-402. We 
hold, therefore, that the trial judge did not 
err in instructing the jury that defendant 
could be convicted of two separate burgla-
ry offenses. 
DENIAL OF RIGHT TO 
REPRESENT HIMSELF 
[14] Finally, defendant contends that he 
was denied his constitutional right to repre-
sent himself and to control his own defense 
by the court's ruling prohibiting him from 
examining a witness. However, the record 
clearly shows that this was not the case. 
The State had called Ron Millard to testify 
concerning the lock picks and keys found in 
defendant's possession. Defendant sought 
to personally cross-examine the witness 
about how the tools could have been used 
to open, without force, some of the laundry 
machines in a matter of seconds. The 
judge did not preclude defendant's ques-
tioning of the witness. Instead, the judge 
stopped defendant from asking questions 
on cross-examination that were outside the 
•cope of direct examination. The judge 
expressly reserved for defendant the right 
to call the expert as his own witness. 
However, defendant did not attempt to call 
the witness, or any other person, as an 
expert to answer his proposed questions. 
The judge appropriately exercised his dis-
cretion by not allowing defendant to cross-
MASON •. WESTERN MORTG. LOAN CORP. Utah H 7 9 
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examine the State's expert witness in an were applied to the scheduled project pur-
improper manner. auant to loan agreement 
The convictions are affirmed. — — 
HALU CJ., and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.f concur. 
(o f l|r»tfHHimMM> 
Cleo B. MASON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
• . 




Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 30, 1985. 
Action was brought against lender 
seeking recovery of damages for wrongful 
disbursal of construction loan proceeds to 
plaintiffs contractor. The Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., 
found that lender had breached loan agree-
ment but ruled that plaintiff had failed to 
establish that she had been damaged, and 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court 
Zimmerman, J., held that plaintiff satisfied 
her burden of proving damages. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart J., concurred in result 
Damages *»189 
Plaintiff aatiafied her burden of prov-
ing damages in her action against lender 
for wrongfully disbursing construction loan 
proceeds to her contractor, where lender 
disbursed nearly $29,000 in proceeds, and 
where uncontradicted evidence indicated 
that lender made no bona fide effort to 
determine whether the disbursed funds 
Jackson Howard, Provo, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
Gregory S. Bell and Lester A. Perry, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and respondent 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Mason appeals from the trial 
court's dismissal of her claim against de-
fendant Western Mortgage Loan Corpora-
tion for wrongfully disbursing construction 
loan proceeds to her contractor. The trial 
court found that Western had breached ihe 
agreement but ruled that Mason had failed 
to establish that she had been damaged 
We reverse and remand for entry of judg-
ment in Mason's favor. 
In January of 1977, Mason and a building 
contractor entered into an agreement for 
the construction of two houses on two 
building lots she owned. The contractor 
had submitted itemized bids of $28,435 and 
$25,724, respectively, for the two houses. 
Simultaneously with the execution of the 
construction contract Mason entered into 
two identical standard form loan agree-
ments with Western under which Western 
agreed to furnish Mason with funds for the 
construction of the houses. The amounts 
to be advanced under the two agreements 
corresponded to the amounts set forth in 
the two bids. The loan documents contem-
plated that the loan proceeds would be held 
by Western and disbursed only for labor 
and materials used to construct the houses 
in accordance with the bids attached to the 
loan agreements. The loans were secured 
by the houses and the underlying real es-
tate. 
As construction proceeded, the contrac-
tor secured funds from Western by 
presenting it with forms entitled "Contrac-
tor's Authorization for Payment" These 
forms specified the amount to be drawn 
from the loan proceeds and identified the 
person or entity to whom payment was to 
be made. During the first and last stages 
of construction, these slips bore the signs-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
STEPHEN W. PORTER, 1 
P e t i t i o n e r , a 
V S . 1 
GERALD COOK, Warden, i 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civ i l No. C86-3469 
Judge Judith M. B i l l i n g s 
The above -ent i t l ed matter came before the Court on the 
10th day of Septemberr 1986, before the Honorable Judith M. 
B i l l i n g s . Pe t i t i oner appeared in person and was represented by 
h i s at torney, P h i l i p Jones, Esq. Respondent was represented by 
h i s at torney, Kimberly K. Hornak, Ass i s tant Attorney General. 
The p a r t i e s having t e s t i f i e d in support of t h e i r pleadings , and 
the Court having heard argument of counsel and rece iv ing the 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s t r i a l transcr ipt and p e t i t i o n e r ' s brief to the Utah 
Supreme Court and the opinion from the Supreme Court, now makes 
and enters i t s t 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1 . The Court f inds that any errors made by 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s t r i a l counsel were minor overs ights or t r i a l 
- tDIUCLEnK'SOFFICL 
Sal! Uho County Utah 
OCT 211936 
», " T a ' a g ^ 
strategy decisions v e i l within the bounds of competent 
representation and any deficiency on the part of t r ia l counsel 
was not prejudicial . 
2 . The Court finds that there i s no specif ic evidence 
which the State had in i t s possession which was not given to the 
pet i t ioner. 
3 . The Court finds that the petitioner was not denied 
his right to ca l l witnesses at the time of t r i a l . 
4 . The Court finds that she need not address the issue 
of pet i t ioner 's ineffect ive appeal claim since the Court found 
that petitioner had ef fect ive assistance of counsel at t r i a l , and 
pet i t ioner 's ineffect ive appeal claim was based on pet i t ioner's 
claim that h is t r ia l counsel was inef fect ive . 
Having made the foregoing findings of fact , the Court 
now makes i t s : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the petitioner received 
ef fect ive assistance of counsel. 
2 . The Court concludes that the State did not f a i l to 
provide any exculpatory evidence to the pet i t ioner. 
3 . The Court concludes that the petitioner was not 
denied compulsory service of process to ca l l witnesses on his 
behalf at the time of his t r i a l . 
The Court concludes that al l other issues of dispute 
Lave been resolved by the Court pursuant to the above findings of 
fac t . 
• 2 -
DATED t h i s c2( day of Ur/jUuy J 1986. 
ATTEST BY ™ C0OM' 
H. DiXOH HirtLXEY ^ _ 
•i+*ic** Distr ict Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law and order 
to Steven H. Porter, attorney pro Be, p. 0. Box 250, Draper, Dtah 
84020, postage prepaid, th i s /b day of October, 1986. 
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